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Cost Efficiency and Board Composition under Different Takaful Insurance 
Business Models 
 
1. Introduction 
  This paper investigates cost efficiency and the extent to which it is affected by 
corporate governance in the takaful (mutual guarantee) insurance market operating 
in compliance with Islamic principles and in which risks are shared by the members 
participating in each takaful risk pool (Khorshid, 2004). Rediker & Seth (1995) report 
that firm-specific cost efficiencies depend in part on how effective the system of 
corporate governance is in controlling and resolving incentive conflicts between 
owners (principals) and managers (agents).  A sound system of governance could 
also help takaful insurers realize operational efficiencies and enhance economic 
performance by improving systems of resource allocation and product design and 
strategic innovation, such as business restructuring initiatives (Thompson & Wright, 
1995). Wang et al.(2007) and Huang et al. (2011) report that the link between 
corporate governance and economic efficiency is important for the management of, 
amongst other things, insurance companies’ asset-liability structure, claims handling, 
and ownership structure. We observe that investigating the corporate governance-
cost efficiency relation in the takaful insurance market is particularly important 
because directors’ fiduciary responsibilities in this market not only extend to 
shareholders and policyholders, but they are also subject to oversight by the Shariah 
supervisory board of the company and the government agency in charge of industry 
regulation. This unique structure of the takaful insurance market thus warrants 
examination. 
 In this study we investigate the macroeconomic environments surrounding takaful 
markets and their impact on takaful insurers’ cost efficiency using two economic 
variables (i.e., inflation and rates of interest). We also examine relative efficiency 
differences between insurers based on the type of takaful business model, namely, 
the mudaraba, wakala and hybrid models. In addition, we control for the potential 
cost efficiency impact of the Shariah supervisory board on decisions taken at the 
corporate board level. We believe that the findings of this study could offer all 
stakeholders – policyholders, insurers, Islamic scholars and government officials 
alike – a better guideline to further develop the takaful insurance industry. These 
contributions represent potentially important advances on recent exploratory studies 
of takaful insurance markets such as Marie et al. (2009) and Abdul Kader et al. 
(2010). For example, in the present study we examine whether the cost efficiency –
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corporate governance relation is affected by input-side macroeconomic influences 
such as inflation and the effects of interest rates. Additionally, the governance effects 
on cost efficiency arising from the type of takaful model employed and the operation 
of the Shariah board are also investigated in this study. Incorporating such factors 
into our analysis contributes new and potentially important insights on the cost 
efficiency-governance relation in takaful insurers. We believe that this contribution 
helps improve our understanding not only of the underlying business economics of 
takaful insurance - an important emergent sector of the international insurance 
industry, but also the function of Islamic corporate finance more generally. 
 Takaful insurance is a cooperative type of insurance in which the insurer helps 
policyholders to provide loss protection services for each other. This arrangement is 
in some ways similar to the mutual-type insurance business in the conventional 
market. This structure, on top of the Islamic principle governing the operational 
scope, limits takaful insurers’ ability to generate additional capital and to invest 
policyholders’ and shareholders’ funds. Indeed, Abouzaid (2007) and Swiss Re 
(2008) argue that takaful insurance markets need more liquid and diversified 
investment choices to attract capital investors. In view of these constraints, 
optimizing operational cost efficiency is likely to be an important business objective 
for takaful insurers, particularly given the dampening of consumer demand in the 
wake of the recent global financial crisis (Ernst & Young, 2009). What is more, the 
takaful insurance industry is relatively young and not all jurisdictions in which the 
insurers operate have fully introduced laws and regulations related to takaful 
insurance operations and corporate governance (Islam, 2003). At the same time, a 
number of jurisdictions (e.g., Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia) permit 
competition between takaful and conventional insurance companies. To stay 
competitive, takaful insurers need to focus more on operating cost minimization than 
on profit maximization.  
 We also focus on economic rather than accounting-based measures of insurers’ 
performance in this study (Marie et al., 2009). Accounting-based performance ratio 
measures are deficient for this study because they combine both input and output 
efficiencies, thus likely distorting the measurement and analysis of efficiency 
performance (Pi & Timme, 1993). Variations in the accounting and actuarial practices 
used by insurance companies can also complicate comparisons of reported financial 
performance (Klumpes, 2005). Focusing on economic measures of takaful insurer 
performance thus helps us avoid potentially confounding effects emanating from 
differences, say, in companies’ treatment of accounting items and their reporting of 
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annual earnings. Furthermore, a significant number of takaful insurers are not listed 
thereby precluding the use of share price-based measures as indicators of financial 
performance (Abdul Kader et al., 2010). Thus, we attempt in this paper to investigate 
the relation between cost efficiency and corporate governance and other firm-specific 
factors in takaful insurance markets globally. 
 The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the key 
features of takaful insurance. Section 3 provides the literature review related to 
corporate governance and takaful insurance cost efficiency. Section 4 defines cost 
efficiency and discusses the methodology and data for the first-stage DEA analysis 
and the second-stage regression analysis. Section 5 analyzes the results and 
Section 6 concludes the study. 
 
2. Takaful Insurance – Operations 
 Interest in insurance markets and the products designed in compliance with 
Islamic law (Shariah) continues to rise around the world. Takaful insurance is 
growing rapidly in numerous Islamic states and Muslim populous countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa. Several countries in other regions, notably Malaysia 
and Indonesia, also promote takaful insurance operations (Kwon, 2007). Swiss Re 
(2008) reports that in 2007 Muslim countries generated about 11 percent (US$45 
billion) of global insurance premiums written. The takaful insurance market share was 
roughly 4 percent (US$1.7 billion) in those countries. Despite being small in size in 
global terms, the takaful insurance market continues to grow at a fast annual rate. 
For example, Swiss Re (2008) note that its growth rate (25 percent, after adjustment 
for inflation) was much higher than that of the conventional market (10.2 percent) 
during the four years 2004-2007. Ernst & Young (2009) also reports that global 
takaful premiums are projected to reach US$8 billion in 2012.1 It is estimated that 
there are between 100-150 takaful insurance companies of varying size and 
complexity operating in nearly 30 countries including a handful of licensed operations 
in Europe.2 
                                               
1 See also Abouzaid (2007), Bhatty (2007) and Kwon (2007) for a detailed analysis of 
takaful insurance operations by region and globally. 
2 For example, in 2007 the United Kingdom’s (UK) insurance industry regulatory – the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) - approved a license for the first takaful insurer - Salaam 
Insurance - to operate in the country. However, to date business has been slow to develop for 
this UK-based takaful insurance firm. 
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 As alluded to above, takaful insurers combine elements of the conventional 
mutual form (e.g., by assigning primacy to the financial claims of policyholders) and 
the equity-capitalized and profit-orientated stock company structure (Swiss Re, 
2008). Takaful insurance operations share several unique characteristics. First, the 
takaful insurer must separate the policyholders’ (takaful) fund from the shareholders’ 
fund. This separation permits the insurer to draw money from the former fund to 
support its insurance operations, while leaving the latter fund intact unless it 
experiences underwriting losses. When policyholders and shareholders share 
operating profits after closure of the book, the arrangement is based on the common 
mudharabah model (see Figure 1).  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
As Figure 1 makes clear, the mudharabah (“profit-sharing”) model allows the capital 
provider (e.g., shareholder) to determine ex-ante the profit-sharing ratio with the 
capital user (e.g., insurance pool) but bear the full risk of underwriting and investment 
losses. A key advantage of the mudharabah model is that ostensibly the managers of 
takaful insurance firms have incentives to engage in efficient operational activities in 
order to maximize returns for capital providers. The mudharabah model has 
traditionally been common in East Asian countries such as Brunei and Malaysia 
(Swiss Re, 2008).  
   When a takaful insurer is permitted to deduct a fee upon receipt of the 
premium, the arrangement is based on the wakalah model (see Figure 2). In this 
case, the shareholders may be entitled to a discretionary return on the annual 
surplus arising from insurance operations in addition to their wakalah (“fee”) for 
contributing capital to support the insurance operations (Kassim, 2007).  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 In both types of arrangements, insurance premiums are in essence treated as 
tabarru (“donations”) to policyholders’ (takaful) funds. Additionally, any surplus – less 
reserves for future claims and other qualified contingencies -- on the takaful fund 
must be returned to policyholders as an annual policy refund or paid out as a zakat 
(“charitable contribution”). In both types of arrangements, takaful insurers – that is, 
the shareholder investors – must be ready to provide a qard al-hasnah (“interest-free 
loan”) for the takaful fund when the fund experiences deficit or, where applicable, fail 
to meet the minimum requirement to maintain solvency margin (Swiss Re, 2008). 
The loan is repayable from future annual surpluses. Variant funding arrangements 
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also exist in the financing of takaful insurance operations.3  Finally, hybrid (i.e., joint 
mudharabah and wakalah) models are becoming increasingly common in takaful 
insurance markets with the principles of the profit-sharing-based mudharabah model 
being applied to investment activities with the wakalah model being used for 
underwriting (Thomson & Flower, 2007).  
 Regardless the financing arrangement structure, takaful operations must be 
Shariah compliant. The insurer must avoid having any haram (“forbidden”) elements 
in insurance contracts that are incompatible with Islamic principles – for example, 
jahalah (“ambiguity or uncertainty”) or riba (“charging interest”). As such, fully Islamic 
finance allows shareholders to participate in the surplus arising from the use of 
contributed insurance capital on a profit-sharing basis that has been agreed ex-ante 
with policyholders (Kwon, 2007). The sharing percentages (S%) at the bottom of 
Figure 1 illustrate this principle. Further, the insurer must employ a halal (“permitted”) 
investment strategy. Exploitive or risky investments are thus prohibited, as they 
possess an element of ghara (“exploitation”). Investment in haram industries – for 
instance, alcohol manufacturing, pork-related production, and the entertainment 
business – is thus discouraged (Al-Suwailem, 2002). 
 Market conduct and corporate governance are probably the most effectively self-
regulated areas in takaful insurance since takaful insurers commonly maintain a 
Shariah supervisory board comprising mainly Islamic scholars (Marie et al., 2009). 
The supervisory board helps the takaful insurer recognize the property rights of all 
stakeholders and preserve the significance of contractual obligations – both explicit 
and implicit (Greuning & Iqbal, 2008). As a governance structure the supervisory 
board oversees the takaful insurer’s compliance with Islamic principles and 
jurisprudence and monitor the insurer’s fiduciary obligations to various stakeholders. 
However, there are several concerns regarding Shariah governance, including the 
issue of the board’s independence as the board members are appointed and 
remunerated by the managers of the takaful insurer (Greuning & Iqbal, 2008).  
 Several other problems exist in takaful insurance markets. In particular, use of the 
mudharabah model may create operational difficulties for takaful insurers. For 
example, Kwon (2007) notes that under the mudharabah model the insurer’s share of 
                                               
3 For example, the musharaka mode of financing allows a capital user (e.g., insurance 
pool) to enter into agreement with a secondary capital supplier (e.g., reinsurer) but then share 
profits and losses in proportion to their respective capital contributions. Takaful reinsurance 
tends to suit this mode of operation (Abouzaid, 2007). 
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profit is dependent upon selling more policies, raising premium rates, and/or 
increasing returns on invested assets.  However, such goals are not easy to achieve.  
Aggressive investment activity has a maisir (“gambling”) element and can inflate the 
volatility of investment results. The insurer may not be free to raise premium rates, 
especially in a competitive market (Khorshid, 2004) or when competing with 
conventional insurers, or need time to attract a sufficiently large number of 
participants to get the scale economy benefit in its operations (Kwon, 2007). The 
insurer becomes less attractive to capital investors when it experiences underwriting 
losses. Maintenance of a reliable number of sales agents whose compensation is 
adversely affected mainly by the investment performance of the insurer can be a 
related issue. The relatively non-diverse Islamic investment opportunities and, when 
compared to conventional financial markets, the relatively low market liquidity for 
Islamic securities can sometimes put downward pressure on reported annual profits 
(Abouzaid, 2007). Limited reinsurance capacity in many Islamic insurance markets, 
particularly for potentially highly volatile and difficult-to-assess non-life insurance 
lines (e.g., environmental risks) can further hinder takaful insurers from achieving a 
desired level of efficiency (Abouzaid, 2007). These considerations, together with the 
fact that financial services regulation and corporate governance in several 
jurisdictions lags behind those of developed economies (Islam, 2003) underscore the 
need for takaful insurers to develop cost efficient operations as a prelude to effective 
long-term strategy.  
 
3. Board Composition and Cost Efficiency 
 Agency theory holds that corporate governance is concerned with the way that 
owners monitor and control managerial performance to achieve their wealth 
maximization objectives (Nelson, 2005). The need for corporate governance thus 
emerges because of unresolved contracting incentive conflicts, particularly those 
between owners and managers of firms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). With a working 
corporate governance system in place, the owners can be assured that their 
managers use shareholders’ capital efficiently, thus receiving a competitive return on 
their investment (Zheka, 2005). In the modern corporation, the board of directors is 
charged with alleviating such conflicts (Hardwick et al., 2011). This principle of 
corporate governance also applies to takaful insurance firms; this is particularly the 
case with regard to ensuring that the interests of participants in the takaful pool are 
protected against the opportunistic and self-interest behavior of shareholders and 
 7 
their managers. The remainder of this section examines the link between corporate 
governance and cost efficiency in takaful insurance firms. 
3.1. Non-executive Directors 
 Firms, especially publicly-traded firms and those firms offering public interest-
related business services (e.g., financial institutions and utilities companies), appoint 
voluntarily or by law business experienced non-executive (outside) directors to 
advise executive (inside) board members on strategic business matters including 
how to achieve operational cost efficiency (Pi & Timme, 1993).4 Indeed, Perry & 
Shivdasani (2005) show that of firms experiencing poor operating performance (e.g., 
increased costs and decreasing returns on assets), those with a majority non-
executive directors on the board are more likely to remedy an adverse financial 
position. Fama & Jensen (1983) argue that, as compared with internal directors, 
outside directors are more likely to have stronger economic incentives to develop 
their reputations as decision control experts and so increase their human capital 
value in the external job market. This argument is supported by Wang et al. (2007) 
who find a positive relation between the proportion of non-executive directors on the 
board and cost efficiency in non-life insurers operating in Taiwan. Accordingly, it can 
be hypothesized that: 
[H1] Other things being equal, the cost efficiency of takaful insurance firms is 
expected to be positively related to the proportion of non-executive directors on 
the board.  
 Of course, the opposite may be observed when the excessive prudence and risk 
aversion of outside directors (for example, motivated by concerns about compliance 
with Shariah principles) could at times negatively affect the cost efficiency of the firm. 
3.2. Chief Executive Officer (CEO)/Chairman Positions 
 Another issue relates to the influence of the CEO, particularly where the person 
concurrently holds chairpersonship for the sake of consolidation of decision 
management and control functions of the company. Hermalin & Weisbach (1991) 
suggest that persons holding both positions tend to appoint non-executive directors 
who are unlikely to question his or her business decisions, thus reducing their 
                                               
4 As in Hossain et al.(2000), we define non-executive directors in this study as board 
members who are identified from published sources as not active or retired employees of the 
takaful insurance firm and do not have close business ties (e.g., as consultants) to that firm. 
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effectiveness as independent monitors of the economic interests of the shareholders. 
The merging of the CEO/Chairman positions could further restrict the dissemination 
of information to other board members, thereby increasing the agency costs of 
managerial decision-making and blunting the effectiveness of the board’s decisions 
(Nelson, 2005; Reheja, 2005). Hermalin & Weisbach (1991, 2003) also consider that 
close monitoring by the Chairman and other board members could help the firm 
increase the effort expended by the CEO to maximize shareholders’ wealth and 
avoid dismissal. Rogers (2002) finds that the separation of the CEO/Chairman 
positions reduces the likelihood of high cash flow volatility arising from excessive 
risk-taking. This could be particularly important in takaful insurers keen to avoid 
highly uncertain and risky situations (ghara). Based on this reasoning, we 
hypothesize that: 
[H2] Other things being equal, the cost efficiency of takaful insurance firms is 
expected to be higher where there is a separation of the CEO and chairman 
positions, all other things held constant.  
 However, there are counter-arguments on appointing a single individual as CEO 
and Chairman, such as the benefits of sure-footed decision-making and a centralized 
system of organizational command and control (e.g., see Brickley et al., 1997). Thus, 
the actual impact of a single person appointment for both positions warrants 
examination. 
3.3. Board Size 
 Pearce & Zahra (1992), Yermack (1996) and Raheja (2005), among others, 
contend that board size is an important factor in determining the effectiveness of 
corporate governance. In particular, Raheja (2005) suggests that large boards can 
provide additional expertise, extensive business networks, and increased monitoring 
capacity. In fact, Pearce & Zahra (1992) find evidence supporting a positive relation 
between board size and performance in the United States (US) corporate sector. 
This leads us to hypothesize that: 
[H3] Other things being equal, the cost efficiency of takaful insurance firms is 
expected to be higher when there are large boards of directors. 
 Yermack (1996) offers a contrasting finding that small boards of directors are 
more effective than large boards in the US. This is because large boards enhance 
the risk of conflicting opinions between board members, thereby promoting more 
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efficient and effective decision-making. Jensen (1993) also observes that large 
governing boards face more coordination problems and so greater difficulties in 
making decisions than small boards of directors. Jensen (1993) recommends that 
corporate boards have a maximum of eight members.  
3.4. Other Internal and External Factors 
 Ownership Structure: Zheka (2005) reports that the ownership structure of a 
company can significantly affect managerial incentives, systems of monitoring and 
control, the decision-making process, and ultimately the financial performance of the 
firm. For example, managers in firms with concentrated shareholdings are likely to be 
subject to greater monitoring and control by shareholders than their counterparts in 
firms with more widely-held ownership structures where individual minority owners 
have incentives to free-ride on the monitoring expenditures of larger investors 
(Grossman & Hart, 1980). This reasoning suggests that, other things being equal, 
takaful insurers with more concentrated shareholdings will be relatively more cost 
efficient than their counterparts with more diffuse ownership structures.  
 Firm Size: Fama & Jensen (1983) argue that enhanced business complexity 
could make monitoring managerial behavior more difficult and less effective in large 
entities than in small companies. Cost efficiency could also be achieved when the 
firm enjoys such size effects as economies of scale (i.e., increased product-market 
share) (Cummins, 1999). Indeed, Diacon et al. (2002) find evidence of firm size 
effects in European life insurance companies. This paper therefore examines the 
impact of firm size on cost efficiency. 
 Product-Mix: Khaled et al. (2001) report that product-mix influences the cost 
efficiency of insurance firms in that insurers with a broad range of products can 
benefit not only from scale economies arising from increasing production but also 
from economies of scope in the use of shared inputs (e.g., labor, technology). 
Accordingly, we predict that multi-product takaful insurers are more cost efficient that 
their counterparts with narrower lines of insurance business. 
 Shariah Supervisory Board: In takaful insurance markets the Shariah board plays 
an important role in ensuring that business and financial matters (e.g., policy contract 
design, premium rating, and reserving) are in conformance with Islamic law 
(Greuning & Iqbal, 2008). However, by pursuing legal and religious compliance 
objectives the Shariah board is likely to stifle operational efficiency. As such, we 
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expect that other things being equal there will be a negative relation between the 
influence of the Shariah board and the cost efficiency of takaful insurers. 
 Macroeconomic Effects: It is widely recognized that the underwriting profitability 
and operational efficiency of insurance firms is affected by cyclical macroeconomic 
effects such as inflation and interest rate changes (Haley, 1993). For example, in 
inflationary periods claims will tend to move upwards in line with the general level of 
prices, whereas in times of high rates of interest insurers are likely to be better able 
to sustain underwriting losses because yields on their bond portfolios will be 
enhanced. Inflation and interest rates are likely to particularly affect the price of 
inputs (e.g., labor and capital) and so they could be potentially important influences 
on the cost efficiency-corporate governance relation in takaful insurance firms. All 
other things held constant, we predict a negative relation between cost efficiency and 
the annual level of inflation and a positive relation between cost efficiency and 
interest rates. 
 Jurisdiction and Takaful Insurance Model: Takaful insurance markets differ in 
terms of regulation quality, tax policy, and the takaful insurance model employed 
(Abouzaid, 2007). For example, countries (e.g., Bahrain and Malaysia) with clear and 
unbiased regulatory guidelines tend to assist regulated insurance firms to use 
resources more efficiently. Some Islamic countries (e.g., Malaysia) also give takaful 
insurers tax advantages, thereby potentially helping them become more cost 
efficient. Furthermore, some Islamic jurisdictions (e.g., UAE and Malaysia) allow 
managers discretion over the type and mix of takaful business model that can be 
used while other countries (e.g., Bahrain and Sudan) do not offer such flexible 
business laws and regulations (Abouzaid, 2007).5  We thus test in this paper for 
regulatory effects and flexibility as to the type of takaful model used by insurance 
firms.  
3.5. Interaction Terms 
Corporate governance structures are means to monitor managerial behavior and 
control agency incentive conflicts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). While supporting this 
argument, Barnhart & Rosenstein (1998) postulate that corporations may use various 
governance mechanisms interactively in order to find optimal solutions to agency 
problems. Conversely, different governance mechanisms may substitute for and/or 
                                               
5  For example, Sudan favors the mudharabah model. Bahrain favors the wakalah model 
for underwriting activities and the mudharabah for investment activities. 
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complement each other and failure to control for the possible interaction among the 
mechanisms may result in misleading conclusions. For example, it could be that cost 
efficiency is affected by the proportion of non-executive directors on the board in 
conjunction with the board size. In this paper, we employ two multiplicative 
interactions – one between board size and non-executive directors, and the other 
between board size and CEO duality – to control for such conjoint effects. 
 
4. Methodology and Data Sources 
 
 In this section, we define cost efficiency and related concepts and we explain the 
methodology used to estimate the efficiency scores. 
 
4.1. Defining Cost Efficiency 
 For a typical takaful insurer, an overall cost efficiency (CE) score reflects both 
technical and allocative efficiencies. Technical efficiency (TE) measures how 
efficiently technology is employed in the use of inputs to achieve a given level of 
output. Like insurers in the conventional market, takaful insurers’ technology includes 
expertise not only in underwriting, marketing and claims management but also in 
actuarial modeling and financial services provision (e.g., profit emergence models 
and asset-liability management systems). Allocative efficiency (AE) refers to how 
efficiently management chooses the mix of inputs at given input prices. A production 
frontier shows the minimum quantity of inputs needed to produce any given quantity 
of output for a perfectly efficient firm, while a cost frontier shows the minimum cost of 
producing any given quantity of output for a perfectly efficient firm. Not all takaful 
insurers are likely to operate at the production and cost frontiers because of technical 
inefficiency, allocative inefficiency or both: that is, they may fail to get the best out of 
their inputs and/or to employ the cost-minimizing combination of inputs. In the 
present study we define cost efficiency simply as: 
 CE = TE × AE         (1) 
 Technical efficiency can be further divided into pure technical efficiency (PTE) 
and scale efficiency (SE). PTE measures how far a takaful insurer is away from the 
production (or cost) frontier under conditions of variable returns to scale, while SE 
measures the relative production loss (or cost increase) caused by a deviation from 
constant returns to scale. Thus, scale inefficiency may be associated with either 
increasing returns to scale (economies of scale) or decreasing returns to scale 
(diseconomies of scale). We can then describe a takaful insurance firm as being cost 
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efficient if its costs are equal to the costs of a best practice firm operating under the 
same conditions (i.e., producing the same output bundle with the same input prices).  
4.2. Data Envelopment Analysis 
 For the measurement of cost efficiency of takaful insurance companies, we 
employ non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA). We select this method in 
part because of the relatively small sample size for our study and the non-normal 
distribution of the underlying data. DEA, a linear programming methodology, is less 
demanding than parametric approaches in terms of the degrees of freedom, the form 
of the production function, and error term assumptions. Compared with parametric 
stochastic frontier methods, DEA uses individual observations rather than population 
averages and focuses on revealed “best practice” firm efficiency frontiers rather than 
on the central tendency properties of firm efficiency frontiers (Zheka, 2005). These 
attributes are particularly advantageous in small sample studies (Cummins & Zi, 
1998; Cummins & Weiss, 2001; Zheka, 2005). The basic DEA formulation assumes 
that our sample of takaful insurance firms each consume different amounts of the 
available inputs to produce different quantities of outputs, under the assumptions of 
convexity, positive monotonicity and the free disposability of inputs and outputs for all 
observations. 
Cost efficiency can then be evaluated from the following variable returns-to-scale 
specification, proposed by Banker et al. (1984):   
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝜃 
𝜃, 𝜆 
𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑥0𝜃 − 𝑋𝜆 ≥ 0, 𝑌𝜆 ≥ 𝑦𝑜, 𝑒
𝑇𝜆 = 1;        𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0;        𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛                           (2) 
 
where: X and Y represent primal vectors of inputs and outputs, respectively, with 
columns xi  and yi for n observations; e is a vector of ones;  = (1, 2, . . . , n)
T is a 
vector of constants; and  is an input radial measure of pure technical efficiency.  
 When i = 1, takaful insurer i is deemed to be on the boundary of total factor 
efficiency.  However, as Schaffnit et al.(1997) make clear, i = 1 is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for a takaful insurer to be technically efficient since (x0, y0) 
may contain slack in its allocation of m-inputs and s-outputs. Thus, takaful insurer i is 
cost efficient only if i = 1, X = x0, and Y = y0; conversely, it is cost inefficient when 
i < 1. Given input price data and assuming cost minimization, pure technical, scale, 
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allocative and overall cost efficiencies can be estimated by running the following cost 
minimizing DEA: 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑤𝑖
′𝑥𝑖
∗ 
𝜆, 𝑥𝑖
∗ 
𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑌𝜆 − 𝑦𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑥𝑖
∗ − 𝑋𝜆 ≥ 𝑦𝑜, 𝑒
𝑇𝜆 = 1;        𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0;        𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚                   (3) 
 
where wi  is a vector of input prices and 
*
ix  is the cost-minimizing vector of input 
quantities for the ith takaful insurer, given input prices and the output levels yi. In 
conducting the DEA, we assume that takaful insurers attempt to minimize the cost of 
employing various inputs to produce outputs. 
 To conduct our DEA analysis we use an unbalanced panel data set of 180 
firm/years for the period 2004-2007. The sample comprises composite and non-life 
takaful insurance firms of varying size, ownership structure, and product-mix, 
operating from 17 countries.6 Financial data for these sample firms are drawn from 
the World Islamic Insurance Directory (2009). The study period in fact covers all the 
years during which takaful insurer data are available. The insurers in the sample 
represent about 33 percent of the total number of takaful insurers currently operating 
world-wide, and their premiums in the aggregate accounts for approximately one-
third of the takaful insurance market premiums written in 2007. We examine direct 
takaful insurers, thus excluding takaful reinsurers and trust fund management 
companies. Finally, all the financial data are converted to US dollar – as reported in 
the World Islamic Insurance Directory (2009) – using the end of year exchange rate. 
 For the purposes of this study, we define a takaful insurance company’s total cost 
as the annual operating expenses incurred in employing two inputs (labor and 
physical capital) to produce insurance output. The labor input is measured by the 
number of employees and the price of labor is proxied by taking the estimated total 
                                               
6  The distribution of takaful insurance firms each year is: 2004 – 37 firms; 2005 – 46 
firms; 2006 – 47 firms; and 2007 – 50 firms. The 17 countries are: Algeria, Bahrain, Brunei, 
Egypt, Kuwait, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, 
Sudan, Tunisia, UAE, and the Yemen. Life (family) and health insurance are offered by some 
composites but constitute less than 10% of total premiums amongst our sample of takaful 
insurance firms. However, we include such outputs as they will affect to some degree the 
costs of production of takaful insurers. Additionally, there are no exclusive takaful family (life) 
insurers in our sample. 
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wage bill divided by the number of employees.7 The price of the capital input for each 
insurer is proxied by dividing total capital expenses (i.e. total operating costs minus 
labor costs) divided by the insurer’s total assets. Since the outputs of takaful insurers 
are not standardized (i.e., cannot be stated in terms of unit cost), we use output 
proxies that are closely related to these services. Like conventional insurers, takaful 
insurers engage in risk-pooling and risk-bearing business and, following Bhatty 
(2007), we assume that takaful insurers produce four outputs: (a) motor vehicle 
insurance, (b) property (fire) insurance; (c) marine and aviation insurance; and (d) 
other insurance.  
 Given the very limited availability of data on takaful insurers, we use gross 
premium contributions to proxy these risk-pooling and risk-bearing outputs, 
recognizing the potential limitation that premium contributions are measures of 
revenue and so represents ‘price  quantity’, rather than just quantity. There has in 
fact been a great deal of discussion in the literature on the most appropriate proxies 
to use as measures of the intangible risk-pooling and risk-bearing outputs of 
insurance firms. Many early studies tended to use premium income as an output 
indicator, but more recent researchers (see in particular Cummins, 1999, and 
Cummins & Weiss, 2001) have tended instead to use the value of benefit payments 
(i.e. claims) as the basis of their output measurements. However, this may be 
unsatisfactory because, while expected claims might be an appropriate proxy for a 
firm’s planned level of insurance output, actual claims paid in any given year may 
differ significantly from expected claims, thereby creating a potentially serious ‘errors-
in-variables’ problem. That is, annual premiums are less likely than annual claims to 
be susceptible to random fluctuations which can cause ‘outlier problems’ for DEA. 
Our use of premium contributions may therefore be justified as they are likely to be 
highly correlated with expected claims. Another advantage of premium-based 
measures of insurance output is that they also reflect the other services (e.g., 
underwriting services) that insurance companies provide.  
4.3 Second-Stage Regression Analysis 
 In the second-stage regression analysis, we estimate the influence of firm-
specific factors as well as market and macroeconomic environmental factors on 
takaful insurer efficiency. The model can be represented as follows: 
                                               
7 Prior studies such as Khaled et al. (2001) suggest that labor costs typically constitute 
about 70 percent of insurers’ annual management expenses. We thus compute labor costs for 
each firm in our sample as: (management expenses x 0.70) ÷ total number of employees. 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑓(𝑁𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑡 , 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 , 𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 , 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 , 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝐼𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐵𝑖𝑡 , 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 , 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 , 𝐿𝑂𝐶𝑖𝑡 ,  
𝑇𝐴𝐾𝑀𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑡, 𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 , 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑆) + 𝑢𝑖 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                                           (4) 
 
where yit
* is the transformed cost efficiency score of the ith takaful insurer in year t 
estimated from the first-stage DEA analysis. The error term, ui, is a firm-specific error, 
and we assume that ui  N(0, 
2
u) and vit  N(0, 
2
v).  
 The dependent variable yit  ranges from zero to one but there is no guarantee that 
estimates from a linear model will meet this restriction. Therefore, as in Barnhart & 
Rosenstein (1998) and Klein (2002), we employ the logit transformation yit
*   = ln[yit 
/(1- yit )] to convert efficiency scores into unrestricted variables that can take values in 
the range [-∞, +∞].8 
 Based on the discussion earlier in this paper, we define independent variables as 
follows. The proportion of non-executive directors on the board (NEXECS) is the ratio 
of the number of non-executive directors to the total number of board directors. The 
separation of the CEO and Chairman (CEO) is represented by a dummy variable 
where CEO = 1 for separate functions and CEO = 0 otherwise. Board size (BSIZE) is 
the total number of directors on the board. Ownership structure (OWN) is measured 
as the proportion of the total number of shares held by the top three shareholders. 
Firm size (LSIZE) is measured as the natural log of total assets9. 
 Shariah Board (SHARB) is the number of people on the board as a proportion of 
the main board size. Takaful model (TAKMOD) is a dummy variable that captures the 
flexibility of the use of the mudharabah, wakalah or hybrid models and is coded 1 
where takaful insurers located in jurisdictions that have flexible business models 
(e.g., the UAE and Malaysia) and 0 otherwise.  
 Product-mix (MIX) is measured by a Herfindahl concentration index such that: 
     


4
1
2
j
jSMIX
         (5) 
                                               
8 For the most efficient takaful insurance firms (with efficiency scores equal to one), we 
subtract a small figure (i.e., 0.00005) from cost efficiency scores to allow the transformation. 
The choice of 0.00005 as an adjustment figure is arbitrary. However, our results are not 
sensitive to choosing other figures (e.g., 0.0005 or 0.0001). 
9 Alternative measures of ownership structure (e.g./, the total percentage of shareholdings 
above 5%) and firm size (e.g., the natural log of annual premiums written) produced 
qualitatively similar results. 
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where Sj is the amount of annual premium income written in the jth line of insurance 
divided by the total premium income of the insurer; and j represents motor, property 
(fire), transportation, and other insurance lines. The closer the Herfindahl index is to 
one, the more concentrated the product function of the insurer. 
 Macroeconomic effects are proxied by the annual average rates of interest (INT) 
and consumer price inflation (INF). Location (LOC) is a dummy variable where 
takaful insurers located in jurisdictions with established regulatory and legislative 
systems (e.g., Bahrain, UAE, and Malaysia) are coded 1 and 0 otherwise. Time 
dummies are included to control for time-effects (e.g., regulatory changes). To take 
care of the issue associated with using multiplicative interaction terms between 
continuous variables in regression analysis – that is, the potential multicollinearity 
problem arising from correlation between each interaction term (e.g., NEXECS × 
BSIZE) and its constituent parts (e.g., NEXECS and BSIZE) – we follow the 
“centering” transformation procedure by Jaccard et al.(1990). This procedure 
involves “centering” corresponding continuous variables by subtracting sample 
means before constructing multiplicative interaction terms. The centered forms of the 
corresponding constituent variables are then used in the regression analysis. We find 
that such a transformation effectively reduces the correlation between the product 
term and the component variables. 
 
5. Key Findings  
5.1 Efficiency Scores 
 Table 1 summarizes the average DEA estimates of technical efficiency (TE), pure 
technical efficiency (PTE), allocative efficiency (AE), scale efficiency (SE) and overall 
cost efficiency (CE) for the takaful insurance companies in our sample for each of the 
four years of the study (2004-7 inclusive).10  
[Table 1 here] 
 All of the efficiency scores take values between 0 and 1, where a value of 1 
represents perfect efficiency. It is clear from the table that, relative to the best 
                                               
10  As a robustness check on our efficiency scores, we calculated rank correlation 
coefficients between TE and an accounting measure of labour productivity (computed as total 
premiums ÷ the labor force) and between CE and an accounting measure of cost 
performance (computed as total premiums / total cost). As expected, the resulting correlation 
coefficients were both positive and statistically significant (+0.27 and +0.30 respectively). 
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practice firms in the sample, takaful insurers generally exhibit high levels of allocative 
efficiency, with a four-year average score of 0.851. However, at the same time, there 
appear to be relatively high levels of technical inefficiency among takaful insurers, 
which lead to relatively high levels of overall cost inefficiency. The four-year average 
technical efficiency score of 0.409 suggests that, in general, the takaful insurers in 
our sample were producing only 40.9% of the insurance services that they could 
have provided if they had been operating with perfect technical efficiency. The four-
year average cost efficiency score of 0.355 implies that the best practice takaful 
insurers were operating with total cost levels that were only 35.5% of the sample 
average. The average scale efficiency score of 0.625 suggests that some takaful 
insurance firms could reduce their unit costs by a change of scale. For our sample, 
84% of the firms exhibited increasing returns to scale, 8% exhibited decreasing 
returns to scale and the remaining 8% exhibited constant returns to scale. This 
evidence suggests that there are economies of scale available for the majority of 
takaful insurers. 
 While it is not possible to make accurate direct comparisons of efficiency scores 
estimated on different frontiers and using different output and input measures, it is 
interesting nevertheless to note that the results reported in Table 1 are a little lower 
than those reported by Cummins & Santomero (1999), who found an average annual 
cost efficiency score of 0.46 for a sample of US life insurers, and a lot lower than the 
average annual cost efficiency score of 0.80 reported in a more recent study from the 
US property-liability insurance industry by Huang et al. (2011). The takaful insurers’ 
scores are also lower than the efficiency scores found for UK non-life companies by 
Hardwick & Guiguis (2007), who reported PTE, AE and CE scores of 0.71, 0.94 and 
0.66 respectively. Similarly, Wang et al. (2007) report an average CE score of 0.72 in 
their analysis of the Taiwanese non-life insurance market. Thus, there is some 
evidence that, relative to best practice firms, takaful insurers have on average been 
achieving lower levels of cost efficiency than those achieved by traditional insurers in 
developed countries. Prior studies (e.g., Huang et al., 2011) attribute cost efficiency 
gains in insurance firms in recent years mainly to technological and operational 
advances. This suggests that compared with their counterparts in more developed 
insurance markets takaful insurers are not realizing the efficiency benefits of new 
technology and the use of the latest business practices. The overall average cost 
efficiency score of 0.355 reported here is also lower than the comparative figure of 
0.70 reported in Abdul Kader et al. (2010). This observation probably reflects the 
effect that compared with previous research we now include data from more and less 
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developed Islamic countries. The relatively low efficiency scores reported in the 
present study are also consistent with the results of recent comparative efficiency 
studies of conventional and Islamic banks (e.g., see Srairi, 2010). 
 
5.2 Second-Stage Regression Results 
 Table 2 Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
second-stage regressions. It shows that the average board size is over 9 members, 
which is greater than the maximum board size (n ≤ 8) recommended by Jensen 
(1993) and slightly smaller than the average board size of 11 members reported by 
both Wang et al. (2007) in their study of the Taiwanese life and non-life insurance 
markets and Huang et al. (2011) in their study of the US property-liability insurance 
market. The non-executive directors, on average, account for a very small proportion 
of the entire boards (approximately 11 percent). This proportion is much smaller than 
the mean of 40 percent of outside director representation in UK life and non-life 
insurers reported by O’Sullivan & Diacon (2003). Furthermore, firm size (LSIZE) 
varies substantially (logged standard deviation = 1.9) probably because the majority 
of takaful insurers in our sample are small to medium-sized entities by international 
standards. The unlogged average total asset value is US$6.5 million for our sample 
in 2007. Moreover, the panel shows that 17 percent of the insurers in our sample are 
located in jurisdictions with established regulatory and legislative systems, 75 percent 
are located in jurisdictions that have flexible business models and 86 percent of them 
separate the CEO and Chairman positions.  
 [Table 2 Here] 
 Panel B of Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients between efficiency scores 
and the various board characteristics and control variables. The positive and 
statistically significant correlation coefficients between LSIZE and cost efficiency 
scores (at p ≤ 0.10, two-tail) suggest that large firms appear to be more efficient than 
small firms. In addition, the negative and statistically significant correlation 
coefficients between INF and cost efficiency scores (at p≤ 0.05, two-tail) suggest that 
takaful companies tend to be less efficient during inflationary periods. This contrasts 
to the finding that high interest rates appear to be negatively related to the cost 
efficiency scores of takaful insurers (statistically significant at p≤ 0.01, two-tail). 
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 Overall, the correlation coefficients between pairs of explanatory variables 
reported in Panel B of Table 2 are generally modest. For example, the strongest 
correlation coefficient value of 0.51 (significant at p≤ 0.01, two tailed) is between 
LSIZE and SE. Moreover, the results from computing the overall all variance inflation 
factor (VIF) is less than the recognized threshold of 10 (Kennedy, 2003).11 Therefore, 
multicollinearity does not seem to pose a problem in our analysis. 
 To enable us to investigate the joint influence of all the independent variables on 
the cost efficiencies of takaful insurers we report random-effects rather than fixed-
effects panel estimations for two main reasons. First, some board characteristics 
(e.g., CEO and NEXECS) have very limited time-series variations. Second, Zhou 
(2001) argues that a fixed-effects estimation that removes within-firm differences may 
not be able to detect the effects of board characteristics (e.g., CEO) with limited 
variations – as is the case in this study. 
[Table 3 Here] 
 Table 3 Panel A reports five model estimations using the five cost efficiency 
measures as dependent variables. The existence of statistically significant interaction 
terms between different board characteristics implies that their effects on takaful 
insurers’ cost efficiency could be conditional on other governance mechanisms. As 
noted by Jaccard et al. (1990), in the presence of interaction terms, the relation 
between an explanatory variable (e.g., NEXECS) and the dependent variable (cost 
efficiency) thus needs to be evaluated together with the estimated coefficients on the 
interaction terms; hence, the coefficient of NEXECS is (β1+ β12*BSIZE). This means 
that the NEXECS-CE, NEXECS-TE, NEXECS-PTE, NEXECS-SE and NEXECS-AE 
relations are likely to vary according to the number of directors on the board.  
Since theory does not specify what value of the moderating variable (e.g., BSIZE) 
should be used to evaluate the directional effect, we follow the procedure of Jaccard 
et al. (1990) to examine the impact of NEXECS. Specifically, we use three different 
levels: “low” measured by the sample mean minus one standard deviation, 
“averaged” by the sample mean and “high” by the sample mean plus one standard 
deviation (see Panel B of Table 3).12 We then conduct a Wald test of the significance 
                                               
11 VIFs are computed as 1/(1 – R2) where R2 is derived from the regression of individual 
explanatory variables on all other explanatory variables. 
12 Because all continuous variables in interaction terms have been ‘centered’, the 
sample means of these variables are in fact equal to zero. 
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of the (marginal) coefficient estimate for NEXECS at each of the three levels of 
BSIZE. Panel B of Table 3 presents the evaluation of marginal effects of the 
coefficients of the three governance mechanisms in the presence of interaction 
terms. 
Regarding H1, we find that the proportion of non-executive directors on the board 
(NEXECS) likely has a negative and statistically significant effect (at p ≤ 0.01, one 
tailed) on the insurer’s cost efficiency when the number of directors on the board is 
below the mean thereby not supporting our prediction. This observation is consistent 
with the general conclusions reported in Abdul Kader et al. (2010). However, the 
effect of NEXECS on cost efficiency becomes positive and statistically significant 
when the number of directors on the board is above the mean thus supporting our 
prior hypothesis. These results suggest that non-executive directors as such do not 
automatically contribute to insurers’ cost efficiency. Instead, they may play a more 
helpful role in monitoring board-level executives when there is additional expertise 
and other benefits afforded by a large board, thus contributing the more efficient use 
of resources. This could arise because non-executive directors may not have 
professional knowledge of, and/or experience in the insurance business (e.g. see 
Faculty and Institute of Actuaries, 2001). 
Regarding H2, the separation of the CEO and board chairman positions (CEO) is 
found to have a negative and statistically significant effect on cost efficiency when the 
number of directors on the board is below the mean (at p ≤ 0.01, one tailed) thereby 
lending support to the alternative prediction. Otherwise, its effect on cost efficiency is 
positive and significant (particularly when the number of directors on the board is at 
the sample mean), supporting our hypothesis H2.  
Regarding H3 and the effect of board size, we find that when the proportion of 
non-executive directors is at or above the mean (whether there is duality of CEO and 
board chairman or a separation between the two positions), the board size seems to 
have a positive and statistically significant effect on cost efficiency (at p ≤ 0.01, one 
tailed). This finding is consistent with hypothesis H3. In other words, directors on 
board seem to be able to contribute to takaful insurers’ cost efficiency only when the 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board is higher than average. 
Turning to the control variables, we find firm size is positive and statistically 
significant in all regressions (at p ≤ 0.05 or better, one tailed). This finding is 
consistent with our expectations, suggesting that large takaful insurers are more cost 
efficient than small takaful insurance firms. This could, for example, arise because 
 21 
increased firm size may enhance operational efficiency through the realization of 
economies of scale (e.g., see Diacon et al., 2002). However, we find that the interest 
rate (INT), although statistically significant (at p ≤ 0.05 or better, one tailed) is 
negatively signed in all of the five regressions reported in Table 3, panel A. This 
implies that high interest rates in fact reduce the operational efficiency in takaful 
insurance firms possibly because improved yields on bond portfolios resulting from 
increasing rates of interest reduce the incentives for managers to better manage 
existing resources. Furthermore, we find no significant difference between the cost 
efficiency scores and ownership structure, product-mix, Shariah board and inflation 
rate. We also find no statistically significant evidence to support the notion that better 
regulated jurisdictions tend to promote better resource use efficiency in the takaful 
market. Finally, we find no evidence of a link between takaful insurers located in 
jurisdictions that allow flexible takaful business models and their cost efficiency. 
 
6. Conclusions  
This study applies DEA to examine the cost efficiency among an unbalanced panel of 
composite/non-life takaful insurers operating in 17 different countries over four years 
2004-2007. Several important results emerge from this study.  
 First, we find that the cost efficiency scores of our sample of takaful insurers (with 
a mean of 0.36) are below the average levels of the cost efficiency of insurers 
relative to best practice insurance firms in developed insurance markets. For 
example, Hardwick & Guirguis (2007) report an average score of 0.66 for the UK 
non-life insurance market and Wang et al. (2007) report an average score of 0.72 in 
their analysis of cost efficiency in the Taiwanese non-life insurance market. This 
observation is consistent with prior takaful insurance research (e.g., Abdul Kader et 
al., 2010) and comparative efficiency studies of conventional and Islamic banks (e.g., 
Srairi, 2010). The results thus highlight the existence of widespread operational 
inefficiency, managerial inertia, and organizational constraints in Islamic financial 
firms. 
 Second, some board characteristics have statistically significant effects on 
insurers’ cost efficiency measures, but their impacts can be both positive and 
negative depending on their interaction with other board characteristics. For example, 
the effect of non-executive directors on cost efficiency is positive and significant (as 
proposed in H1) but only when the number of directors on the board is above 
average. However, the effect of non-executive directors on the cost efficiency of 
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takaful insurers is negative and statistically significant when the total number of 
directors on the board is below the mean. Therefore, the overall picture portrayed 
here is that corporate governance is an inherently complex process and that because 
of the possible interactions among different governance arrangement, the 
effectiveness of corporate governance and its impact on the economic performance 
of takaful insurance firms should be evaluated holistically rather than separately for 
individual mechanisms. Indeed, Hermalin & Weisbach (2003, p.7) note that 
“…despite their importance, formal economic theory on boards has been quite 
limited”. 
 We suggest that some of the findings in the current study can have potentially 
important commercial and policy implications. For example, improving the 
appointment of skilled and experienced non-executive directors to the board, and 
clarifying their role in advising on operational and strategic matters such resource 
allocation and usage could be a potentially important policymaking implication of our 
research. Furthermore, regulators in takaful insurance markets need to be 
appreciative of the importance of improving the operational efficiency of takaful 
insurers’ use and allocation of inputs, particularly capital. This would help to improve 
corporate solvency and ensure better economic returns for shareholders and 
policyholders. Moreover, our finding that firm size is a principal driver of cost 
efficiency in takaful insurance markets suggests that legislators and regulators may 
need to introduce further measures (e.g., tax breaks) to encourage the growth of 
takaful insurers in order to realize scale and scope efficiencies. We acknowledge that 
interpretation of the results of our study may need to be tempered by recognition of 
the inherent limitations of our research design such as the small sample size and 
limited financial data that are publicly available. However, we have attempted to 
control for these limitations where possible in order to derive reliable and robust 
results (e.g., by adopting a panel data design). Finally, we consider that our study 
lays the foundations for further research to be carried out on the takaful insurance 
industry, which is poised to become one of the major emerging international markets 
for insurance over the next decade or so. 
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Table 1: Summary of Takaful Insurers’ Mean Efficiency Scores 
 
 
 
Year 
 
TE 
 
PTE 
 
AE 
 
SE 
 
CE 
 
2004 
 
0.383 
 
0.626 
 
0.876 
 
0.553 
 
0.342 
 
2005 
 
0.425 
 
0.653 
 
0.857 
 
0.628 
 
0.379 
 
2006 
 
0.343 
 
0.575 
 
0.884 
 
0.594 
 
0.318 
 
2007 
 
0.475 
 
0.630 
 
0.796 
 
0.705 
 
0.378 
 
2004-7 
 
0.409 
 
0.621 
 
0.851 
 
0.620 
 
0.355 
 
TE: Technical Efficiency 
PTE: Pure Technical Efficiency 
AE: Allocative Efficiency 
SE: Scale Efficiency 
CE: Cost Efficiency  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients for the Second-
stage Regression (n = 180) 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
CE 0.355 0.258 0.301 0.01 0.999 
TE 0.409 0.302 0.324 0.013 0.999 
PTE 0.621 0.594 0.297 0.1 0.999 
SE 0.625 0.663 0.309 0.02 0.999 
AE 0.851 0.903 0.153 0.256 0.999 
NEXECS 0.108 0.000 0.170 0.000 0.333 
CEO 0.856 1.000 0.353 0.000 1.000 
BSIZE 9.944 9.000 4.862 2.000 28.000 
OWN 0.781 0.985 0.269 0.000 1.000 
LSIZE 9.790 9.604 1.899 4.277 16.248 
MIX 0.381 0.303 0.221 0.120 1.000 
SHARD 0.462 0.380 0.388 0.090 3.000 
INT 0.045 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.170 
INF 0.232 0.090 0.285 0.000 1.200 
LOC 0.167 0.000 0.374 0.000 1.000 
TAKMOD 0.750 1.000 0.434 0.000 1.000 
 
Panel B: Correlation coefficient matrix  
  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) 
CE (a) -           
TE (b) 0.95*** -         
PTE (c) 0.67*** 0.72*** -        
SE (d) 0.75*** 0.79*** 0.23*** -       
AE (e) 0.38*** 0.15** 0.09 0.17** -      
NEXECS (f) -0.08 -0.06 0.07 -0.12 -0.15** -     
CEO (g) -0.12 -0.11 -0.02 -0.12 -0.03 0.35*** -    
BSIZE (h) 0.04 0.07 -0.05 0.15** -0.06 0.01 -0.13* -   
OWN (i) -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.05 -0.16** -0.17** 0.11 -  
LSIZE (j) 0.47*** 0.49*** 0.28*** 0.51*** 0.13* 0.06 -0.16** 0.10 0.09 - 
MIX (k) -0.09 -0.04 0.03 -0.07 -0.21*** 0.12 -0.08 -0.03 -0.15** 0.02 
SHARB (l) -0.07 -0.08 0.02 -0.17** -0.05 0.24*** 0.16** -0.45*** -0.13* -0.17** 
INT (m) -0.22*** -0.19*** -0.20*** -0.08 -0.31*** 0.30*** 0.12 0.00 -0.13* -0.02 
INF (n) -0.19*** -0.17** -0.02 -0.18** -0.23*** 0.13* 0.27*** 0.01 0.28*** -0.20*** 
LOC (o) -0.02 0.00 -0.10 0.12 0.03 0.21*** 0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.24*** 
TAKMOD (p) 0.09 0.10 -0.04 0.21*** 0.01 0.03 -0.24*** -0.10 0.12* 0.35*** 
  (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)     
MIX (k) -          
SHARB (l) 0.00 -         
INT (m) 0.18** 0.04 -        
INF (n) 0.20*** 0.01 0.24*** -       
LOC (o) 0.04 0.19** 0.13* -0.19** -      
TAKMOD (p) 0.00 0.19** 0.46*** -0.53*** 0.12 -     
 
Note: 
1. CE, SE, AE, PTE and TE = overall cost, scale, allocative, pure technical and technical efficiency 
scores computed using DEA; NEXECS = the proportion of non-executive directors on the board; CEO 
= dummy variable, 1 = the separation of the CEO from board Chairman, 0 = otherwise; BSIZE = the 
number of directors on the board; OWN = the proportion of the total shares held by the top three 
shareholders; LSIZE = natural log of size, measured by total assets; MIX = product mix, measured by 
a Herfindahl concentration index; SHARB = the number of people on the Shariah board as a 
proportion of the main board size; INT= annual average rates of interest; INF = consumer price 
inflation; LOC = dummy variable, 1 = insurers located in jurisdictions with established regulatory and 
legislative systems, 0 = otherwise and TAKMOD = dummy variable, 1 = insurers located in 
jurisdictions that have flexible business models, 0 = otherwise. 
2. Pearson correlation coefficients are computed between metric variables and Spearman-rank 
correlation coefficients are computed between CEO, LOC and TAKMOD and their correlation with 
other variables. 
3. *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% (two tailed). 
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Table 3: Random Effects Regression Results: Board Characteristics and Cost Efficiencies of Takaful Insurers (n = 180) 
Panel A: Regression Coefficients  
Our regression model is expressed as: yit*  = f (NEXECSit, CEOit, BSIZEit, OWNit, LSIZEit, MIXit, SHARBit, INTit, INFit, LOCit , TAKMODit, ITit, Years) + ui + vit 
 
Dependent Var.  
Predicted 
sign 
CE 
(1) 
TE 
(2) 
PTE 
(3) 
SE 
(4) 
AE 
(5) 
   Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
NEXECS b1 +/- 1.05*** 1.55 1.20 1.43 3.32* 1.95 0.87 1.22 -0.26 1.10 
CEO b2 +/- 0.53 0.68 0.94 0.72 0.38 0.99 0.66 0.72 0.62 0.43 
BSIZE b3 +/- -0.07 0.10 -0.06 0.10 -0.24 0.15 0.06 0.10 -0.01 0.06 
OWN b4 + -1.25 1.32 -1.94 1.61 -0.44 1.60 -1.95 1.32 -0.27 0.67 
LSIZE b5 +/- 0.55*** 0.20 0.65*** 0.17 0.48** 0.21 0.61*** 0.16 0.24** 0.13 
MIX b6 - -1.68 1.81 -0.81 2.14 0.82 1.97 -0.99 1.89 -1.11 0.89 
SHARB b7 - -0.12 0.56 -0.37 0.64 -0.27 0.77 -0.50 0.59 0.17 0.46 
INT b8 + -15.44** 6.38 -16.29*** 6.20 -13.31* 6.93 -12.12** 5.41 -9.47** 4.38 
INF b9 - -0.31 1.08 -0.84 1.10 -0.12 1.40 -0.72 1.01 -0.54 0.89 
LOC b10 + -0.07 1.14 -0.37 1.27 -0.88 1.09 -0.10 1.05 0.00 0.57 
TAKMOD b11 + 0.93 1.02 0.97 1.01 0.39 0.89 1.10 0.92 0.37 0.74 
NEXECS×BSIZE b12 ? -0.42 0.26 -0.44* 0.24 -0.69*** 0.24 -0.26 0.21 -0.14 0.19 
CEO×BSIZE b13 ? 0.18 0.11 0.20** 0.10 0.28* 0.16 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.08 
Constant b14  -4.50* 2.66 -4.80* 2.64 -2.01 2.71 -3.49 2.30 0.32 1.40 
Year dummies   yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  yes  
Adj-R2   0.24  0.29  0.22  0.32  0.16  
u2   1.75  2.23  2.33  1.93  0.69  
v2   2.29  2.20  2.63  1.84  1.96  
 
Notes: 
1. CE, SE, AE, PTE and TE = overall, scale, allocative, pure technical and technical scores computed using DEA ; NEXECS = the proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board; CEO = dummy variable, 1 = the separation of the CEO from board Chairman, 0 = otherwise; BSIZE = the number of directors on the 
board; OWN = the proportion of the total shares held by the top three shareholders; LSIZE = natural log of size, measured by total assets; MIX = product mix, 
measured by a Herfindahl concentration index; SHARB = the number of people on the Shariah board as a proportion of the main board size; INT= annual 
average rates of interest; INF = consumer price inflation; LOC = dummy variable, 1 = insurers located in jurisdictions with established regulatory and 
legislative systems, 0 = otherwise and TAKMOD = dummy variable, 1 = insurers located in jurisdictions that have flexible business models, 0 = otherwise. 
2. *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% (one tailed). 
3. The continuous variables (e.g., NEXECS) that enter multiplicative interactions are centered (i.e., subtracting sample mean) before constructing interactions. 
The centered form of these continuous variables is also used in the regression.  
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Panel B: Evaluation of Marginal Effects of Board Characteristics  
Variables Coefficient CE TE PTE SE AE 
NEXECS β1+β12*BSIZE      
 If BSIZE = high 50.17*** 56.82*** 53.53 44.81** 29.53** 
 If BSIZE = average 4.15 2.49 2.76 0.56 2.05 
 If BSIZE = low -60.50 -57.39 -18.39** -66.24* -43.51 
       
CEO β2+13* BSIZE      
 If BSIZE = high -10.28 -8.55 -14.17 -0.88 -5.00 
 If BSIZE = average  1.15 2.08* 0.64 1.57** 0.40 
 If BSIZE = low  -82.36*** -78.25*** -119.31*** -87.60*** -28.65 
       
BSIZE β3 + β12*NEXECS + β13*CEO      
 If NEXECS =high & CEO =1 -0.17 0.68*** 1.23*** 0.45 0.74*** 
                              & CEO =0 - - - - - 
 If NEXECS=average & CEO =1 0.07** 0.05 0.01 0.07* 0.02* 
                                   & CEO =0 0.22 0.06 -0.31 0.37*** 0.04 
 If NEXECS =low & CEO =1 - - - - - 
                             & CEO =0 - - - - - 
 
Notes: 
1. Low = (mean – 1 std. dev.); average = mean; high = (mean + 1 std. dev.), where mean and standard 
deviation are the sample mean and standard deviation of corresponding variable (after centering). 
2. *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% (one tailed). 
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Figure 1: The Mudharabah Model in Takaful Non-life Insurance 
 
 
     Source: Kwon (2007)  
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Figure 2: The Wakalah Model in Takaful Non-life Insurance 
 
 
     
    Source: Thompson and Flower (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
